Abstract. Secure information flow analysis aims to prevent programs from leaking their H (high) inputs to their L (low) outputs. A major challenge in this area is to relax the standard noninterference properties to allow "small" leaks, while still preserving security. In this tutorial paper, we consider three instances of this theme. First, we consider a type system that enforces the usual Denning restrictions, except that it specifies that encrypting a H plaintext yields a L ciphertext. We argue that this type system ensures security, assuming strong encryption, by giving a reduction that maps a noninterference adversary (which tries to guess which of two H inputs was used, given the L outputs) to an IND-CPA adversary (which tries to guess which of two plaintexts are encrypted, given the ciphertext). Second, we explore termination leaks in probabilistic programs when typed under the Denning restrictions. Using a notion of probabilistic simulation, we show that such programs satisfy an approximate noninterference property, provided that their probability of nontermination is small. Third, we consider quantitative information flow, which aims to measure the amount of information leaked. We argue that the common information-theoretic measures in the literature are unsuitable, because these measures fail to distinguish between programs that are wildly different from the point of view of an adversary trying to guess the H input.
Introduction
Suppose that a program c processes some sensitive information. How do we know that c will not leak the information, either accidentally or maliciously? How can we ensure that c is trustworthy?
The approach of secure information flow analysis is to classify c's variables into different security levels, such as H (high) or L (low), and to do a static analysis, often in the form of a type system, on c prior to executing it. The goal is to prove that c conforms to some specified flow policy, which can encompass both confidentiality and integrity concerns; in this paper, we will focus exclusively on confidentiality. See [1] for a survey of this area.
It is important to recognize that the secure information flow problem involves two adversaries: the program c itself, and also the observer O of c's public output. These two adversaries have distinct capabilities: 384 G. Smith -The program c has direct access to the sensitive information (the initial values of H variables), but its behavior is constrained by the static analysis. -The observer O has direct access only to c's public output (the final values of L variables, etc.), but its behavior is unconstrained, except for computational resource bounds.
The decision as to what constitutes c's public output is quite important, of course; in particular secure information flow becomes far more difficult if we consider c's running time to be a public output.
A classic approach to secure information flow in imperative programs is based on the Denning restrictions proposed in [2] : -An expression is classified as H if it contains any H variables; otherwise, it is classified as L. -To prevent explicit flows, a H expression cannot be assigned to a L variable.
-To prevent implicit flows, an if or while command whose guard is H may not make any assignments to L variables.
If c satisfies the Denning restrictions, then it can be proven [3] that c satisfies noninterference, which says (assuming that c always terminates) that the final values of the L variables are independent of the initial values of the H variables. Hence observer O, seeing the final values of the L variables, can deduce nothing about the initial values of the H variables. Unfortunately, noninterference is often too strong in practice. This leads to a major practical challenge: how can we relax noninterference to allow "small" information leaks, while still preserving security? In the next three sections, we consider three instances of this theme. In Sections 2 and 3, we consider secure information flow analyses that are permissive about leaks caused by encryption and nontermination, respectively; these sections summarize [4] and [5] , where additional details can be found. In Section 4, we present some preliminary ideas about a general theory of quantitative information flow, which aims to measure the "amount" of information leaked.
Secure Information Flow for a Language with Encryption
Suppose that E and D denote encryption and decryption with a suitably-chosen shared key K. We allow program c to call E and D, but we do not give it direct access to K. Intuitively, we would like to extend the Denning restrictions with the following rules:
But are these rules sound ? Note that they violate noninterference, since E(e) depends on e.
In fact these rules are unsound if encryption is deterministic. For example, suppose that secret is a H n-bit variable and that leak and mask are L variables. Consider the following program, in which "|" denotes bitwise-or, and " 1" denotes right shift by one bit:
This program is allowed under the proposed rules. But if E is deterministic, then the program efficiently copies secret into leak , because then the test in the if command is true iff secret | mask = secret.
In fact it is well understood in the cryptographic community that deterministic encryption cannot give good security properties. 1 We recall the definitions of symmetric encryption scheme and IND-CPA security from [6] 
We recall the notion of IND-CPA security, which stands for indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack. An adversary A is given an LR oracle of the form
where K is a randomly generated key and b is an internal selection bit, which is either 0 or 1. When A sends a pair of equal-length messages (M 0 , M 1 ) to the LR oracle, it selects either M 0 or M 1 according to the value of b, encrypts it using E K , and returns the ciphertext C to A. Thus when A sends a sequence of pairs of messages to the LR oracle, it either gets back encryptions of the left messages (if b = 0) or else encryptions of the right messages (if b = 1). A's challenge is to guess which of these two "worlds" it is in.
Formally, A is executed in two different experiments, depending on the choice of the selection bit b:
Thus A's IND-CPA advantage is its probability of (correctly) guessing 1 in world 1, minus its probability of (wrongly) guessing 1 in world 0. Finally, SE is IND-CPA secure if no adversary A running in polynomial time in the security parameter k can achieve a non-negligible advantage. (As usual,
Now we define the programming language that we will consider. We use a simple imperative language with the following syntax: ← R is a random assignment; here R ranges over some set of probability distributions on the integers.
The commands for encryption and decryption are slightly non-obvious. There are two issues: first, encryption cannot conceal the length of the plaintext; second, for IND-CPA security there must be many ciphertexts corresponding to a given plaintext, so ciphertexts must be longer than plaintexts. We deal with these issues in our language by assuming that all integer values are n bits long, for some n, and that encryption always takes an n-bit plaintext and produces a 2n-bit ciphertext. Thus the encryption command has the form (x, y)
? ← E(e); it encrypts the n-bit value of expression e, putting the first n bits of the ciphertext into x and the second n bits into y. Symmetrically, the decryption expression D(e 1 , e 2 ) takes two expressions, giving 2n bits of ciphertext, and produces the corresponding n-bit plaintext.
As shown in [3] , the Denning restrictions can be enforced using a type system. We extend such a type system with rules for the new constructs; we do not show the rules here (they can be found in [4] ), but they enforce the following rules: e 2 ) is H, even if e 1 and e 2 are L.
The reason for the last rule is that a random value is independent of the initial values of H variables.
We now wish to argue that our type system is sound. To do this, we introduce the idea of a leaking adversary. A leaking adversary B has a H variable h and a L variable l, and other variables typed arbitrarily. It is run with h initialized to either 0 or 1, each with probability 1/2. It can call E() and D(), and it tries to copy the initial value of h into l. Formally, B is executed in the following experiment: The leaking advantage is defined in this way to reflect the fact that B can trivially succeed with probability 1/2. We argue the soundness of our type system via a reduction; for the moment, we drop decryption from our language:
Theorem 1. Given a well-typed leaking adversary B that does not call D() and that runs in polynomial time p(k), there exists an IND-CPA adversary A such that
The theorem gives the following immediate corollary:
then there is no polynomial-time, welltyped leaking adversary B that achieves a non-negligible advantage.
The proof of Theorem 1 is by explicit construction. Given leaking adversary B, we construct IND-CPA adversary A that runs B with a randomly-chosen 1-bit value of h. Whenever B calls E(e), A passes (0 n , e) to its oracle E K (LR(·, ·, b)) and returns the result to B. If B terminates within p(k) steps and succeeds in leaking h to l, then A guesses 1; otherwise A guesses 0.
To understand this construction, the first thing to notice is that if the selection bit b is 1, then B is run faithfully-whenever B calls E(e), it correctly receives in reply E K (e). But if the selection bit b is 0, then B is run unfaithfully-now whenever B calls E(e), it receives in reply E K (0 n ), which is a random value that has nothing to do with e.
What is A's IND-CPA advantage? When the selection bit b is 1, then B is run faithfully and hence
When the selection bit b is 0, then B is run as a well-typed program in a language with random assignment but no encryption-in other words, B no longer can take advantage of the leak associated with the typing rule for encryption. Hence we would expect that standard noninterference results will prevent B from copying h to l with probability better than 1/2. However, there is a subtlety here-when B is run unfaithfully, it might fail to terminate. (For example, E(h) and E(h + 1) are always distinct if B is run faithfully, but they have a small probability of being equal if B is run unfaithfully.) To deal with this possibility, we need a careful analysis of the behavior of well-typed probabilistic programs that might not terminate. Such an analysis is described in Section 3 of this paper; it allows us to show that
as expected. (Details are given in [4] .) In conclusion we get
as claimed.
We have shown that our type system rules out well-typed, efficient leaking adversaries. But can we get a result more like noninterference? To this end, let c be a well-typed, polynomial-time program in our language, and let μ and ν be memories that agree on L variables. Suppose we run c under either μ or ν, each with probability 1/2, and show the final values of the L variables of c to observer O, which we here refer to as a noninterference adversary. Could O guess which initial memory was used?
More formally, a noninterference adversary O for c, μ, and ν is a program that refers only to the L variables of c and outputs its guess into a new variable g. O is run in the following experiment, where h 0 is a new variable: Thus we have shown that, on polynomial-time programs c, our type system ensures a property that is essentially as good as noninterference-a polynomialtime observer O is basically unable to determine anything about the initial values of the H variables from the final values of the L variables.
Finally, we remark that Theorem 1 can be generalized to the full language including decryption. A similar reduction can be done, except that from leaking adversary B we now construct an IND-CCA adversary A [6] , which has a decryption oracle D K (·) in addition to its LR-oracle E K (LR (·, ·, b) ). It is not clear to us whether this is strictly necessary-see [4] for more discussion.
We conclude this section by mentioning some related work. Peeter Laud has pioneered the area of secure information flow analysis in the presence of encryption; his works include [8, 9, 10] . The third of these papers treats a richer language with primitives for generating and manipulating keys directly, though not handling decryption explicitly, and necessitating more complex typing rules and proofs. Other recent work in this area includes [11, 12, 13, 14] ; a major goal of these works is to "scale up" the language to the point that practical applications can be built.
More distantly related is the large body of recent work aimed at proving computational security properties of cryptographic protocols; examples include the work of Backes and Pfitzmann [15] and Laud [16] . Such work has a quite different adversary model than what is used in secure information flow analysis-the focus is on distributed systems in the presence of an active adversary which can insert and modify messages without constraint by a type system, but which does not have direct access to secrets.
2 Also type systems for cryptographic protocols seem to offer less support for general-purpose programming-for example, the type system in [16] does not allow branching on secret data.
Termination Leaks in Probabilistic Programs
In Section 2, we assumed that all adversaries run in time polynomial in k, the key size. This might seem to be "without loss of generality" (practically speaking) since otherwise the adversary takes too long. But what if program c either terminates quickly or else goes into an infinite loop? In that case, observer O might quickly be able to observe whether c terminates.
Furthermore, the Denning restrictions allow H variables to appear in guards of loops, because disallowing them would seem too restrictive in practice. This means that H variables can affect termination, as in examples like while secret = 0 do skip; leak := 1
It is for this reason that the noninterference property discussed in Section 1 includes the assumption that program c always terminates.
In this section, we try to quantify such termination leaks. The setting we consider is probabilistic programs with random assignment, but no encryption or decryption. We use the same type system as in Section 2, except that we no longer need typing rules for encryption and decryption; thus we simply enforce the Denning restrictions, extended with a rule that says that random values are L. Semantically, our programs are modeled as Markov chains [17] of configurations (c, μ), where c is the command remaining to be executed and μ is the memory.
In this setting, perfect security is given by probabilistic noninterference, which says that the final probability distribution on L variables is independent of the initial values of the H variables.
Here is an example of a program that violates probabilistic noninterference:
terminates with l = 0 with probability 1/2 and loops with probability 1/2. And if h = 1, then it terminates with l = 1 with probability 1/2 and loops with probability 1/2.
However we can argue an approximate probabilistic noninterference property:
Theorem 3. If c satisfies the extended Denning restrictions and loops with probability at most p, then c's deviation from probabilistic noninterference is at most
2p.
In our example program, p = 1/2, and the deviation is |1/2 − 0| + |0 − 1/2| = 1 = 2p, achieving the bound specified by the theorem. (The first term compares the probability that l = 0 after h = 0 and after h = 1; the second compares the probability that l = 1 after h = 0 and after h = 1.) To prove this theorem, we introduce the idea of a stripped program, denoted by c . We form c from c by stripping out all subcommands that do not assign to L variables, replacing them with skip. (In terms of the type system, this is equivalent to stripping out all subcommands of type H cmd .) For example, the stripped version of our example program is the following: 
In other words, as we pass from c to c , the probabilities of L outcomes can only increase or stay the same; they cannot decrease.
In prior work on secure information flow, probabilistic bisimulation has often been a useful proof technique (see, for example, [18] ). But in proving the Bucket Property, we use a non-symmetric probabilistic simulation [19] instead. Specifically, we define a fast simulation, which is a modification of the weak simulation considered by Baier, Katoen, Hermanns, and Wolf [20] .
We develop the theory of fast simulation in the abstract setting of Markov chains. Intuitively, state t simulates state s if t can simulate whatever s can do. Thus if s can go to some state s with probability p, then t should be able to match this by going to one or more states t , t , t , . . . , each of which simulates s , with total probability at least p. However we must not "double count" t's probabilities-for example, if s goes to s with probability 1/3 and t goes to t with probability 1/2, then if we use t to simulate the move to s we must remember that 1/3 of t 's probability is "used up", leaving just 1/6 to be used in simulating other moves of s. These considerations lead to what is called a weight function Δ that specifies how the probabilities are matched up. A further consideration is that s might go to a state that is already simulated by t-in this case s has made an "insignificant" move, which t should not need to match. Thus in general we partition the states reachable in one step from s into two sets, U and V , corresponding to the "significant" and "insignificant" moves, respectively.
Formally, given a (discrete-time) Markov chain with state set S and transition probabilities P, we define: We now describe the key theory associated with fast simulation. First, given binary relation R, we say that a set T of states is upwards closed if s ∈ T and sRt implies that t ∈ T . Next, given state s, natural number n, and set T of states, let us write Pr(s, n, T ) to denote the probability of reaching a state in T from s in at most n steps. Now we have the key theorem, which says that if t fast simulates s, then t reaches any upwards closed set T with at least as great probability and at least as quickly as s does:
Theorem 4. If R is a fast simulation, T is upwards closed, and sRt, then Pr(s, n, T ) ≤ Pr(t, n, T ) for every n.
We remark that the universal relation R U = S × S is trivially a fast simulation. But under R U the only upwards closed sets are ∅ and S itself, which means that Theorem 4 is uninteresting in that case.
We now apply the theory of fast simulation to the setting of probabilistic programs that satisfy the extended Denning restrictions. The key result is that we can define a fast simulation R L such that (c, μ)R L ( c , μ), for any well-typed command c.
Definition 3. If c and d are well-typed commands, then we say that cR L d if this can be proved from the following six rules:
1. c 1 R L skip, if c 1 does not assign to L variables. 2. (x := e)R L (x := e).
(x
We extend R L to configurations with the following two rules:
It can be proved that R L is a fast simulation, and that for any well-typed c, cR L c . This implies the Bucket Property. For given some L outcome (such as l = 17), let T be the set of memories that satisfy that outcome (for example, T = {ν | ν(l) = 17}). Since T is upwards closed under R L , we can apply Theorem 4 to deduce that Pr ((c, μ) , n, T ) ≤ Pr(( c , μ) , n, T ), for every n. Finally, we can extend to the probability of eventually terminating in T , since this is just lim n→∞ Pr((c, μ) , n, T ).
Given the Bucket Property, we can now prove the approximate probabilistic noninterference property. Recall that c contains no H variables. Hence if memories μ and ν agree on L variables, then the behavior of ( c , μ) must be identical to that of ( c , ν). Thus we can build a "bridge" between (c, μ) and (c, ν):
Since (c, μ)'s loop bucket contains at most p units of water, the sum of the absolute value of the differences between the L outcome buckets of (c, μ) and of ( c , μ) is at most p. Similarly for (c, ν). Hence the sum of the absolute value of the differences between the L outcome buckets of (c, μ) and of (c, ν) is at most 2p. We conclude this section by remarking that observer O, given the final values of c's L variables, could try to distinguish between initial memories μ and ν through statistical hypothesis testing. Assuming that the probability p of nontermination is small, then the approximate noninterference property gives us a way to bound O's ability to do this, as in the work of Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky [21] . Finally, we remark that the Bucket Property is used crucially in the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2 of this paper, to bound the advantage of leaking adversary B when run unfaithfully.
Foundations for Quantitative Information Flow
In the two previous sections, we considered information leaks from H to L associated with encryption and with nontermination, showing that secure information flow analyses can be permissive about such flows, while still preserving security guarantees. More generally, it would be valuable to develop a theory of "small" information leaks that is independent of any particular programming mechanism. To this end, in this section we consider the foundations of a quantitative theory of information flows. Such a quantitative theory has long been recognized as an important generalization of the theory of noninterference, and there has been quite a lot of recent work in this area, including the works of Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [22, 23, 24] , Köpf and Basin [25] , Clarkson, Myers, and Schneider [26] , Lowe [27] , and Di Pierro, Hankin, and Wiklicky [21] . Also related is work in quantitative anonymity, such as that of Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi, and Panangaden [28] .
We can identify four main research steps required to develop a useful theory of quantitative information flow:
1. Define a quantitative notion of information flow. 2. Show that the notion gives appropriate security guarantees.
3. Devise static analyses to enforce a given quantitative flow policy. 4 . Prove the soundness of the analyses.
In this paper, we limit our discussion to Steps 1 and 2.
Moreover, rather than trying to tackle the problem in full generality, we will consider important special cases in the hopes of better understanding what is going on. We therefore adopt the following conceptual framework:
-We assume that there is a single secret h, which is chosen from some space S according to some a priori, publicly-known probability distribution. -We assume that c is a program that has only h as input and (maybe) leaks information about h to its unique public output l. -We assume that c is deterministic and total.
Having made these assumptions, we can now follow Köpf and Basin [25] and observe that the public output l is a function of the secret h; thus there exists a function f such that l = f (h). Furthermore, f induces an equivalence relation ∼ on S: The reason that we say "in principle" in Extreme 2 is that O might be unable to compute the value of h efficiently from the value of l; our framework here is thus information-theoretic rather than computational.
To assess situations between the two extremes considered above, we need appropriate quantitative measures. Here we review two common informationtheoretic measures. Let X be a discrete random variable whose values have probabilities p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p n , where we assume for convenience that p i ≥ p i+1 , for all i. The Shannon entropy of X is defined by
The Shannon entropy can be viewed informally as the "uncertainty" about X; more precisely it can be understood as the expected number of bits required to transmit X optimally. The Guessing entropy of X is defined by
The Guessing entropy can be understood as the expected number of guesses required to guess X optimally. Let us now apply Shannon entropy to the partitions induced by program c. For simplicity, let us consider the case where h is uniformly distributed over space S, and |S| = n. Suppose that the partition induced by c consists of r equivalence classes C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r , where |C i | = n i , for all i. Then the Shannon entropy of h is
This can be viewed as the "initial uncertainty about h". And the Shannon entropy of l is
Plausibly, this can be viewed as the "amount of information leaked". This view is supported by the two extreme cases discussed above. In Extreme 1, there is just one equivalence class, of size n, so
and in Extreme 2, there are n equivalence classes, each of size 1, so
1 n log n = log n.
We can also ask another question, which is more crucial from the point of view of security: how much uncertainty about h remains after the attack? This quantity can be calculated as a conditional Shannon entropy:
Quite reasonably, in Extreme 1 we get H(h|l) = log n and in Extreme 2 we get H(h|l) = 0. Finally, there is a pretty equation relating these three quantities:
which can be read as "initial uncertainty = information leaked + remaining uncertainty".
So is
Step 1 ("Define a quantitative notion of information flow") finished? In the restricted framework that we are considering, it certainly seems promising to define the amount of information leaked to be H(l), and the remaining uncertainty to be H(h|l). And in fact this seems to be the literature consensus: it is the approach taken by Clarke, Hunt, and Malacaria [22, 23, 24] and by Köpf and Basin [25] (although they also consider G(l) and G(h|l) ). The approach of Clarkson, Myers, and Schneider [26] is more general, because they consider the case when the observer O has (possibly mistaken) beliefs about the probability distribution of h. But in the special case when O's beliefs match the a priori distribution, and when the expected flow over all experiments is considered [26, Section 4.4] , their approach then reduces to using H(l) and H(h|l).
So we might turn our attention next to Step 2 ("Show that the notion gives appropriate security guarantees"). A first step that can be taken here is to show that H(l) ("the amount of information leaked") is 0 iff c satisfies noninterference. This is good, of course, but it is just a first step-it establishes only that the zero/nonzero distinction is meaningful. A more interesting result is the Fano Inequality, which gives lower bounds, in terms of H(h|l), on the probability that observer O will fail to guess the value of h correctly, given l. Unfortunately these bounds are extremely weak in many cases.
Really the key question for Step 2 is whether the value of H(h|l) ("the remaining uncertainty") accurately reflects the threat to h. Let us consider some example attacks to answer this question.
First consider a program c that simply copies 1/10 of the bits of h into l; this could be done with a program like this:
Assuming as before that h is uniformly distributed over S, where |S| = n, this attack partitions S into 2 0.1 log n = n 0.1 equivalence classes, each of size 2 0.9 log n = n 0.9 . Hence we get H(l) = 0.1 log n and H(h|l) = 0.9 log n, which seems quite reasonable since 9/10 of the bits of h are completely unknown to O after the attack. But now suppose that the possible values of h range from 0 to n − 1 and consider the following program:
This program puts 90% of the possible values of h into one big equivalence class, and puts each of the remaining 10% into singleton classes. Hence we get H(l) = 0.9 log 1 0.9 + 0.1 log n ≈ 0.1 log n + 0.14 and H(h|l) = 0.9 log(0.9n) ≈ 0.9 log n − 0.14 These quantities are essentially identical to those for the previous attack! But now observer O can guess h with probability 1/10. The conclusion is that if H(h|l) is used as the measure of remaining uncertainty, then Step 2 cannot be done well, because H(h|l) fails to distinguish between two attacks that are completely different from the point of view of their threat to the secrecy of h.
We might now revisit Step 1, in the hopes of finding a measure that works out better with respect to Step 2. But why not use Step 2 to guide Step 1? Why not define a measure of remaining uncertainty directly in terms of the desired security guarantees? Here is a very simple and basic measure that we can consider: let us define V (h|l), the vulnerability of h given l, to be the probability that observer O can guess h correctly in one try, given l.
Let us now explore the value of V (h|l) in the case when h is uniformly distributed, with n possible values. If the partition induced by c consists of r equivalence classes C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r , where |C i | = n i for all i, then the probability of ending in class C i is n i /n and the probability that O can guess h in one try, given that h is in C i , is 1/n i . Remarkably, the n i 's cancel out and we get
So in this case all that matters is the number of equivalence classes, not their sizes! Let us now consider some examples to assess the reasonableness of V (h|l): However it is clear that using a single number to represent a complex partition is necessarily crude. Compare examples d and e, which both have V (h|l) ≈ 1/10. In example d, 1/10 of the time O will know the value of h, since it ends up in a singleton class, and 9/10 of the time O will have no idea about the value of h, since it ends up in the big equivalence class. In contrast, in example e we find that O never knows the exact value of h, but always knows it to within 10 possible values. Hence giving O a second guess would be essentially useless in example d, but would double O's chance of success in example e. Nevertheless, it seems that V (h|l) ≈ 1/10 is a reasonable (though crude) measure of the threat to the secrecy of h in both of these examples.
We conclude by remarking that V (h|l) is unfortunately not so good with respect to compositionality. This will be important when Steps 3 and 4 are considered-ideally, a static analysis should determine the threat associated with a sequential composition c 1 ; c 2 from the threats associated with c 1 and with c 2 . But this does not seem possible for V (h|l). Another challenging question is whether the information-theoretic approach of this section could somehow be integrated with the computational complexity approach of Section 2. These remain topics for future study.
